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the outset. of group interaction when there is no structure, a larger number 
of cycles may be necessary to establish a pattern, than when the group has 
developed at least a partial structure. For example, in a group where one 
actor has already established superior behavior patterns wil.h a number of 
the other actors, that actor may come to establish similar patterns with 
the remaining others quite easily. In such cases a minimal cycle consisting 
of a questioning look directed toward another, responded to by a brief nod, 
may be enough to establish the new behavior pattern. It is even possible 
that an actor who witnesses a behavior pattern develop between two other 
actors comes to "share" in the pattern by identifying himself with one of 
the two actors. 
The context of the group is also likely to affect the process; for example 
in labora.tory groups where act.ors ma.y have no serious investment in the 
group as such, and no expectations of extended interaction with each other, 
they may be able to establish behavior patterns on the basis of a few con-
sistent interaction cycles. However, in a. permanent committee within an 
organizational context, where individual and group interests are at stake, 
and where individuals expect to be working together for long periods, the 
emergence of behavior patterns will be slower. Finally, there are individual 
dispositional differences to consider- there will be actors who are disposed 
to accept behavior interchange patterns on the basis of a. few consistent 
cycles and there will be those who require large numbers of cycles before a 
behavior interchange pattern is accepted. 
Another basic question posed by the concept of a. behavior pattern is 
how consistent the power and prestige significance of the cydes making up 
the pattern has to be. For reasons of theoretical simplicity we prefer to 
conceptualize the process of emergence of behavior patterns as calling for 
total consistency. Given that. a pattern has emerged, however, we certainly 
do not expect all interact.ion cycles to be consistent with the pattern. In 
fact we believe that after a behavior interchange pa.l.tern has emerged, a 
second pattern involving the same actors, and inconsistent. with the first 
can emerge at a. later time. This is one of the means by which the power and 
prestige orders of groups of long duration change. However, the emergence 
of a pattern inconsistent with an existing pattern is likely to be a difficult 
process, and we certainly do not expect to sec it in laboratory groups which 
interact for limited time periods. 
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Since the number of cycles of interaction making up a behavior pattern 
is highly variable we prefer to define the concept from the points of view of 
the act.ors involved. That is, for a. set of consistent interaction cycles to be 
a. behavior interchange pattern, the actors involved must accept, through 
their actions, that one actor has a. positive behavior pattern and the other 
a negative behavior pattern. Actors may not articulate the notion and they 
need not even give it conscious thought, but they will recognir.e the pattern 
at some level of perception. Given these considerations we define the term 
as below. 
Definition 1 (A Behavior Interchange Pattern) is a Bet of task be-
havior cycles involving two or more actors, where the acts are mutually 
accepted, and which are consistent in their power and pre.•tiqe significance. 
A behavior pattern is made up of two complementary parts, a positive 
part and a negative part. Thus when a. behavior pattern is established 
between two actors, one will be seen as possessing the superior, or positive 
part, and the other the inferior, or negative part. Therfore a. behavior 
pattern is a basis of diserimination between actors and functions like a. 
status element in providing expectation information about actors. By the 
same token, behavior patterns also enter into status organizing processes 
like other status elements, and combine with other status elements in the 
formation of aggregated expcct.ation states. We use the symbol b( +) to 
represent the positive, and the symbol b(-) to represent the negative parts 
of the behavior pattern, respectively, in the graphic representation of status 
situations. These two parts are connected by a dimensionality relation 
which represents both their linkage and opposition to each other. 
Our representation of behavior elements in the in the graphic represen-
tation of status situations, uses a second basic concept, that of an abstract 
power and prestige behavior type. This concept captures I. he fact that there 
are idealized notions of what superior or high status power and prestige be-
haviors are like, as well as complementary notions of whal. low status or 
inferior power and prestige behaviors are like. These power and prestige 
behavior types may differ in detail from culture to culture, but all cultures 
have well defined notions of how high and low status people are supposed 
to behave in task situations. We represent the two types as B(+) and B(-
), standing for high and low status behavior types respectively. Abstract. 
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power and prestige behavior types are relevant to states of abstract task 
ability, which are induced elements in the theory of status characteristics 
and expectation states. That is, an actor who possesses a high st.alus power 
and prestige behavior type would be expected to possess high abstract task 
ability, and an actor who possesses a. low status type would be expected to 
possess low abstract task ability. Behavior patterns and abstract power a.nd 
prestige behavior types are obviously related, and a. basic t.heorctica.l notion 
is that when a behavior pattern becomes salient in a. group, its different 
parts will come to be seen as relevant to the like signed types of abstract 
power and prestige behavior. These ideas are spelled out in the formulation 
we present in the second part of this paper. 
A discussion of the concept of behavior patterns naturally leads to the 
question of which actors will come to possess positive, and which negative 
pattern parts. Natura.] as the question is, for the purposes of this formula-
lion it is not relevant since we arc not concerned with the process by which 
behavior patterns emerge, but with how they affect the power and prestige 
order once they emerge. We take behavior patterns a.s givens, very much 
like the theory takes status characteristics a.s givens, and explore their im-
plications for power and prestige orders. All the same, a brief discussion 
of the major determinants of the distribution of behavior patterns is called 
for. First, it should be pointed out that the theory of status characteristics 
a.nd expecta lion states, does make an assertion a.bou t how behavior pat-
terns are distributed. The theory asserts that, if actors are discriminated 
by a. status characteristic, then the actors who possess the positive state 
of the status characteristic a.re more likely to come to possess t.he positive 
parts of behavior patterns. However, the theory makes a probabilistic as-
sertion - it is not the case that. the higher status actor will always come 
to possess the positive pattern part. In fact one of the aims of the current 
extension is t.o account for how behavior can modify status based expect.a-
tions, and therefore, power and prestige orders. As noted in our previous 
discussion, a major consideration is the content of the interact.ion. To the 
extent that actors ca.n evaluate each others' contributions, those providing 
superior inputs are more likely to possess the positive parts of behavior pat-
terns. These evaluations of individual performances will also he affected by 
social pressures to conform to majority opinions, and t.he need to further 
the task process. A further consideration is the styles of behavior, or the 
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task cue levels of the actors involved (Dovidio and Ellyson, 1982; Nemeth 
1983; Ridgeway, Berger and Smith 1985; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway and 
Rosenholtz, 1986) Recent research has shown clearly that the levels at which 
actors exhibit task cue behaviors affect their power and prestige standings, 
as well as showing that actors' levels of task cue beha.vior is a function of 
their power and prestige standings. Therefore we would expect. actors who 
exhibit higher levels of the look speak/look listen ratio, who speak fluently 
and fast, and generally exhibit confident styles of behavior t.o possess the 
superior behavior interchange patterns more frequently than actors who 
do not. Finally, we also expect individual dispositional factors to affect 
who possesses the positive, and who the negative pattern parts. People do 
clearly differ in their dispositions to be "ascendant" (Schutz, 1958). 
Legitimation 
The theory of status characteristic and expectation states focuses on the 
fac.t that states of status characteristics have task performance expectations 
associated with them. These expectations can be diffuse or specific depend-
ing on the type of characteristic, and they form the basis on which aggre-
gated task performance expectations are formed for actors in status situa-
tions. At the same time, diffuse status characteristics also have moral and 
normative expectations associated with them (Berger et a/., 1966; Berger 
et a/., 1980). Thus, if gender is a status characteristic, the male is not only 
supposed to be better than the female at performing tasks, hut he is also 
supposed to be "better" in a generalized moral sense. Therefore in male 
dominated societies it is "right, meet, and proper" that the male has a. 
more valued status position, and more valued goal objects in general, than 
the female. 
Theories within the expectation states framework have focused on this 
aspect of status characteristics as well. In particular reward expectations 
theory (Berger et a/., 1985) describes and explains how status character-
istics lead to the formation of reward expectations in status situations. 
Reward expectations are, usually, correlated with task performance expec-
tations, but they are not identical to them. In an interaction between two 
actors, it is possible that one has higher task performance expectations, 
hut. lower rewa.rd expectations, than the other. While tnsk performance 
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expectations are the primary determinants of power and prestige orders 
in task performing groups, reward expectations also affect the patterns of 
power and prestige behaviors in such groups. This point has been most 
dearly established in the literature on gender differences in task perform-
ing groups (see Meeker and Weitzell-O'Neal, 1977, Lockheed, 1985 and 
Wagner 1988 for reviews of this literature). An important finding is that 
females have trouble assuming leadership roles, and exhibiting leadership 
behaviors. This is true not only for mixed gender groups but for all female 
groups as well, which poses a problem for the theory of status characteris-
tics and expectation states. As a solution to this problem Ridgeway (1988) 
has suggested that in all female groups which function in male dominated 
social contexts (as most social contexts are) the diffuse status cha.ra.cierist.ic 
gender becomes salient and prevents the females from assuming leadership 
roles. Why the salience of the gender characteristic should have such an ef-
fect is explained by the Ridgeway and Berger theory of legitimation (1986). 
According to Ridgeway and Berger the process of legitimation is one 
of turning power and prestige positions into positions that arc accorded 
normative rights and privileges, elements which are not necessarily asso-
ciated with power and prestige positions. While legitimation is a concern 
for any power and prestige position, it is particularly important for the 
top power a.nd prestige position, because its legitimation creates what we 
take to be the leadership position. The theory asserts that legitimate sta-
tus positions, especially the leadership position, are valued goa.! objects 
which groups allocate to their members, and therefore, that legitimation is 
a matter of reward expectations. The key concept of reward expectation 
theory (Berger et a/., 1972, 1985) is that of a. referential structure. Refer-
entia.! structures are "socially validated beliefs that describe how the states 
of valued characteristics that. individuals posses are associated with differ-
ences in reward levels" (Berger et a/., 1985). Referential structures relate 
generalie,ed actors with generalized classes of rewards and serve as social 
standards on the basis of which actors form reward expedations in status 
situations. Since there arc salient referential structures associating being 
female with low reward classes in male dominated social contexts, females 
have trouble exhibiting high status power and prestige behaviors. 
Given these considerations our theoretical integration would be incom-
plete if it did not incorporate these ideas. A further reason for incorpora.t-
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ing legitimation dynamics into the current integration is that the concept 
of behavior pattern is naturally relevant to legitimation processes. Our dis-
cussion of the behavior pattern has focussed on its property of conveying 
information relevant to task performance expectations, and has portrayed 
these patterns as status elements. Behavior interchange patterns are in-
deed status elements, but they also convey a different kind of information: 
That the actors involved are acknowledging, affirming and validating each 
others' relative positions. That is, an actor who watches a behavior pat-
tern emerge between two other actors not only has a new basis for forming 
or modifying expectations for the two actors, but also observes that they 
accept each others differential power and prestige positions. This aspect 
of behavior patterns, that they are expressions of interpersonal va.lida.tion 
of statu~ positions, is of crucial importance to legitimation processes. This 
point has been made best by Zelditch and his associates (Zelditch and 
Walker, 1984; Walker, Thomas and Zelditch 1986). Their analysis of the 
nature of legitimation of authority within organizations leads to two con-
ditions for legitimation. One is resources granted to the authority by the 
larger organization in which his unit is imbedded and the other is the per-
sonal approval given the authority by the subordinates within the unit. 
Zelditch and Walker consider the first condition to be more important, 
however they also point out that it does not apply to informal groups with-
out forma.! hierarchies. In fact, for the kinds of groups we arc dealing with, 
personal approval of group members is, probably, the primary source of 
legitimation 2 . 
A hypothetical example may clarify the role of behavior patterns in 
legitimation processes: Consider a. situation where a. number of previously 
unacquainted individuals start interacting on a. task. Suppose two actors 
establish a behavior pattern with the first possesing the positive, and the 
second the negative parts of the pattern. That is, the second actor is 
agreeing with, deferring to, and accepting innucncc from the first actor. 
Now suppose that a new behavior pattern is establisher! between the first 
actor and a. third actor, with the first actor again possesing the positive 
part of the pattern. That is, the third actor is also agreeing with, deferring 
2 0ther sources of legitimation as formulated by Ridgeway and Berger are the magnitude 
of reward expectations and the consistency of reward and task expectations. 
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to, and accepting influence from the first. Extend this image hy adding 
further actors who estahlish similar behavior patterns with respect to the 
same first actor. It is not difficult to see the actors coming to ad as though 
the first actor was their legitimate leader as their numbers increase. Each 
validates the first actor's position with respect to himself, and each sees a 
number of others similarly validating the first actor's position with respecl. 
to themselves. Thus ea.ch actor validates all others' behaviors, and the first 
actor's power and prestige position is thoroughly confirmed as superior to 
all others. 
What is likely to occur when an informal task group of previously unac-
qua.inted individuals start interacting is obviously more complicated than 
the hypothetica.l situation we have constructed. However, some features 
of the general situation are likely to be quite similar to this hypothetical 
case. As actors interact behavior patterns will begin to appear, and form 
a. configuration which will be far from random. This configuration of be-
havior patterns which emerges is likely to have two important features: It 
will be "clustered" and it will be "transitive". By clustered we mean that 
the initial behavior patterns to appear will involve a. small subset of actors, 
rather than being distributed among many. To see this point, remember 
that behavior interchange patterns are visible not only to the actors in-
volved but to all actors in the situation, and consider the simplest case: 
The first behavior pattern has been established between two actors A and 
B, with A possesing the superior part. At this point, actor A has a positive 
status element, actor B has a negative status element, and no other actors 
posses any other status elements. Therefore, actor A will have higher, and 
actor B will have lower, task performance expectations than all the other 
actors in the group. This means that. actor A is more likely than any other 
actor to produce performance outputs, and also that he is the actor most 
likely to be addressed, and given an action opportunity by, another actor. 
Therefore actor A is the actor who is most likely to be involved in the next 
behavior pattern to emerge in the situation. 
On the other hand actor B is less likely to produce performance outputs 
than the other actors, but he is likely to be the target o[ actors who are 
behaving strategica.lly. B's possession of the negative part. of the behavior 
pattern might well lead other actors to think that if they were to inter-
act. with B, they would end up possessing positive behavior pattern parts. 
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While we cannot make a definite statement about B's probability of being 
involved in the next behavior pattern to emerge, it seems reasonable to 
assume that it will be greater than the probabilities for the other actors. 
Thus, it is the case that the next interchange pattern to emerge is more 
likely to in valve either A or B, than two of the other actors, and A would 
be more likely to possess the positive part and B the negative part of the 
pattern. This argument can be generalized to say that, at any time, a new 
behavior pattern to emerge is more likely to involve at least one actor who 
was involved in a previous interchange pattern, than not.. Therefore, be-
havior patterns will tend to be clustered among a. subset of actors rather 
scai.tered among the entire set. 
By saying that the configuration of behaviors will be transitive, we 
mean that if actor A and actor B posses the positive and negative parts of 
a behavior pattern respectively, and if actor B and actor C similarly share 
the positive and negative parts of a behavior pattern, then if actor A and 
actor C share a pattern, actor A will posses the positive part, and actor .6 ~ ·- ~ 
will posses the negative part. That is, the actors can be linearly ordered in 
terms of their possesion of behavior patterns. 
It is reasonable to assume that if A observes B deferring to himself and 
C deferring to B, he is unlikely to defer to C. This point also follows from 
the theory. By our previous argument the second behavior interchange 
pattern to emerge in a group situation is likely to involve one of the two 
actors, A and B, who were involved in the first interchange pattern, and 
another actor C. If the pattern involves A and C, then since A has higher 
task performance expectations by virtue of the positive patt.ern he already 
posseses than C who posseses no status elements, he is more likely to come 
to posses the positive part of the new pattern as well. If that is the case, 
than no matter how a behavior interchange pattern is later established 
between B and C, the resulting overall configuration will be transitive. 
Similarly, if the pattern involves B and C, B has lower task performance 
expectations than C, and is more likely to come to posses the negative part. 
of the pattern. Then, rcgardles of how a. pattern is established between C 
and A, the resulting configuration will be transitive3 • 
3 The argument presented here is paraUcl to, and motivated by results presented by 
Chase (1982). Farraro and Skvoretz (1988) have presented a formal analysis of Chase's 
results and formulated a general theory of dominance orders. 
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The properties of clustering and transitivity present a. pidure of power 
and prestige order formation which is quite distinctive: The first thing to 
happen is that a nucleus involving a few actors is formed. 'vVe think of 
this nucleus as the core of the group, and believe that its existence involves 
important substantive issues. As the nucleus increases to a reasonable size, 
and can properly be thought of as a core, it will sl.a.rt. to function as a. de-
cision making body, as an executive for the group. This suggests that the 
core will not increase indefinitely as more and more actors become related 
t.o each other in terms of behavior patterns, but will come l.o stabilize at 
a certain size. The properties of clustering and transitivity also make it. 
highly probable that the core will have an internal structure such that one 
actor will posses a number of positive and no negative parts of behavior pat-
terns. This actor may become the legitimate leader of the group. Whether 
he will actually come to be the legitimate leader will depend on two fac-
tors: One is the amount of support, that is the number of positive pattern 
parts, he posseses. How many will be enough will depend on a number of 
situa.t.ional factors. For example in groups of short duration and relatively 
lit!.le personal investment on the part of the group members, fewer patterns 
should be necessary to generate a legitimate order, compared to groups of 
longer life span and greater member investment. The at.lributes of the 
group task should have similar effects. We would expect that more impor-
tant tasks would necessitate greater support than less important tasks, and 
more urgent tasks would necessitate less support than less urgent tasks. 
The other factor determining whether legitimation will occur or not is 
the match between the status cha.ract.eristics possesed by the actor who 
may become the legitimate leader and the salient. referential structures in 
the situation. The referential struct.nres determine who is acceptable for 
legitimate leadership and who is not. Thus if there arc salient. refcrcntia.l 
structures which relate being male to highly valued stntus positions and 
being female to relatively low valued status positions, legil.irnation will not 
occur if the actor who is candidate to legitimate leadership is female. 
When the power and prestige order is legitimated l.he actors come to 
behave as though they had socially defined status positions, positions which 
have normative rights, privileges and duties associated with them. Obvi-
ously the top, or leadership, position is of specia.l importance in a legitimate 
order, as the leader is assigned special executive rights. 
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With the emergence of the leader, a new dimension of group interaction 
comes into existence, the leader interacts with the group as a whole, rather 
than as a collection of individuals. That is the leader has the right to 
address the group as a single entity. Obviously, other members can, and do 
address the group as a whole, but when they do they are basically relating 
to each actor sepera.tely at the same time. This point, of course, makes 
a. considerable amount of difference to the patterns of participation in the 
group. 
An Expectation Measure for Multi-Actor Situations 
A fundamental idea in expectation states theory is that power and prestige 
positions are situational and relative. An actor's power and prestige po-
sition can only be meaningfully spoken of with respect l.o a specific other 
ncl.or in a given setting. The determinant of the power and prestige position 
of an actor with respect to another is the actor's self-other task performance 
expectations. These ideas have lead quite naturally to the use of the con-
cept of expectation advantage, defined as the difference between the actor's 
expectations for self and those for the other with whom he is interacting, 
as the basic expectation measure in the theory. However, for multi-actor 
situations4 such as the ones we are concerned with, this measure is not 
apropria.te since an actor ca.n be simultaneously interacting with more than 
one other actor. In fact, participation in a group discussion often involves 
simultaneous interaction between a performing actor and all other actors. 
Therefore we need a. measure that can place an actor on the expectation 
dimension with respect to a number of other actors simultaneously, rather 
than merely a single other actor. This measure should capture the expec-
tations for an actor relative to all the other actors in the situation, a.nd 
should do this in as simple a way as possible. We proceed as follows. 
The model generates expectation values for actors which are measured 
on a. scale running from minus one to plus one. That is, expccf.a.tions can 
be positive or negative, reflecting expectations for success or failure, re-
spectively. While such scaling reflects the qualitative significance of expec-
<~The mathematical formulation does inc1ude multi-actor situations, however it is lim-
ited to the kind where only two of the actors interact at one time, but who the actors are 
changes over the course of time. 
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tations, it, makes multiple comparisons difficult to formulaic algebraically. 
A simple way to obtain a useful measure of relative expectations begins by 
adding one to each expectation value, thus making them all nonnegative. In 
this way all transformed expectation values will lie between r,ero and two. 
We can now formulate a measure which places the actors relative to each 
other on the expectation dimension by dividing each of these new values 
by the sum of these values over all the interadanis in the situation. These 
operations can be symbolically expressed as below. 
The measure "s" we call "expectation standing", with the subscript 
identifying the actor in question. The "e"s in the above formula. stand 
for expect.ation values for the actors, and n is the number of actors in the 
situation. The expectation standing represents an actor's proportion of 
the total expectations in the situation, and thus places an actor on the 
expectation dimension relative to all others in the group. 
Theory and Model 
Given the theoretical considerations of the previous sections we can for-
mulate an extension of the theory of status characteristics and expectation 
states which applies to multi-actor, status heterogenous and status homoge-
nous situations. We first formulate a. general theory, and then construct a 
specific model based on the theory for Bales type discussion groups. Our 
presentation of the formulation does not restate the original formula.tion, 
which we refer to as the core theory, in detail, as it has appeared in print 
a number of times, but it indicates its general ideas, and explicitly stales 
the new additions and modifications. 
The Theory 
The scope of the formulation covers collectively oriented task groups. The 
task must be valued and the actors must take each others behaviors into 
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account in performing the task. The actors may, or may not, be discrimi-
nated by status characteristics. We refer to a situation which fullfils these 
conditions as an S situation. 
A status characteristic is defined as a socially valued characteristic with 
at least two distinct states which are differentially valued, and which have 
task performance expectations associated with them. Task performance ex-
pectations can be diffuse - that is they can refer to a. generalized expectation 
irrespective of any particular task, or they can be specific, that is they can 
be defined with respect to a. specific ta.sk. Status characteristics are called 
diffuse or specific depending on the type of expectations they carry. Sex 
and age are examples of diffuse status characteristics, and musical ability 
and mathematical ability are examples of specific characteristics. 
We construct a graph diagram to represent the structure of an S situa-
tion. This diagram is constructed from the point of view of one particular 
actor. However, at this point we assume that there is consensus, so that 
the structure is the same from the points of view of all the a.ctors in the 
situation.5 Actors and status elements such as states of status characteris-
tics which are salient in the situation are represented as points in the graph 
structure, and three relations, represented by signed lines in the graph, can 
hold between these elements. Actors may possess states of status char-
acteristics, and a state of one status characteristic may be relevant to a 
state of a different status characteristic. Two status elements are relevant 
if an actor possesing the first expects, or is expected to possess the second. 
Possesion and relevance are "positive" relations. The third relation which 
is "negative", and is called dimensionality, holds between the two differen-
tially evaluated states of the same characteristic possessed by actors in the 
situation, such as male and female, indicating their linkage a.nd opposition. 
The graph of the situation always contains two elements T(+) and T(-) 
which represent outcome states, success and failure a.t the task, respectively. 
Two other points representing the high and low states of the instrumental 
ability (i.e. the ability that is necessary for succesful task performance) are 
also always in the graph of the situation, and these clements are relevant 
to the similarly signed task outcome states. Thus the initial graph of any 
5 Situations where actors have different points of view of a given situation are! obviously! 
of special substantive interest. However the modelling of such situations is something to 
be attempted in the future after we model the simpler situations where there is consensus. 
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S situation consists of a set of unconnected points representing the actors 
in S, two task outcome states, and two states of the instrumental ability, 
C*(+) and C*(-), which are relevant to the outcome slates. 
The initial structure is completed through the salience and burden of 
proof processes. The salience assumption describes how status characteris-
tics become salient. There are two conditions under which status charac-
teristics become salient - when they are initially relevant to the task, and 
when they discriminate between the actors in the situation. It should be 
noted that salience is a. theoretical state a.nd not a. question of what the 
actors do, or do not, perceive in the situation. A state of a status char-
acteristic which does not satisfy these conditions will nol become salient 
even though it is clearly perceived by the actors in the situation. Similar 
conditions need to be staled for the salience of behavior patterns. 
The assumption places theoretical conditions on when behavior inter-
change patterns become salient, parallel to the conditions for the salience 
of status characteristics. Once a.ga.in, salience does not depend on how vis-
ible or highlighted the pattern is, but on the condition that the pattern 
provides new status information in the situation. Thus if two actors are 
discriminated by a status characteristic, and a behavior pattern emerges 
such that the actor with the high state of the status characteristic also has 
the positive pattern part, the pattern will not be salient. 6 In such cases the 
behavior pattern does not provide new status information but only con-
firms existing status differences. However, if the reverse had been the case, 
that is, if the actor with the high state of the status characteristic came to 
posses the negative behavior pattern part, the pattern would be providing 
a new basis of status, and would be salient. If the actors a.re discriminated 
1•
1 
inconsistently by status characteristics, we believe lha.t behavior patterns 
.,, will become salient, because given inconsistency, any information is new 
I 
information. Similarly when actors a.re not discriminated by status char-
6There arc good theoretical reasons to as~ume that when actors arc di~criminated by 
diffuse status characteristics, consistent behavior patterns will not become salient: The so-
cial evaluations of honor, esteem, and respect associated with diffuse status characteristics 
make consistent behavior patterns only to be expected. The case for specific status char-
acteristics is less clear: It may be the case that behavior interchange patterns do become 
salient when they are consistent with specific status characteristic discrimination. How-
ever, given the absence of relevant empirical evidence we prefer the simpler formulation 
which does not distinguish the two types of status characteristics. 
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acteristics, that is in homogenous groups, behavior patterns provide new 
bases of status differentiation, and therefore they will become salient.. These 
ideas are summarized in the assumption given below. This assumption is 
meant to be taken in conjunction with the original salience assumption. 7 
Assumption* 1 {The Salience of Behavior Patterns) Given a behav-
ior interchange pattern which occurs between an actor and one or more 
other actors, the states of the behavior interchange pattern will become 
salient 
1. if the actors are not discriminated by status elements, or 
2. if the parts of a behavior interchange pattern are inconsistent with 
status elements which discriminate the actors. 
The burden of proof assumption of the core theory describes how salient 
status elements which are not connected to the task at the outset become 
connected. The name reflects the basic principle that unless a status ele-
ment is explicitly dissociated from the task, it will come to be relevant to the 
similarly signed task outcome state, that is positive clements will become 
relevant to success, and negative elements will become relevant to failure. 
For diffuse status characteristics the process works through the activation 
of generalized expectation states which become relevant to the instrumental 
characteristic. For specific status characteristics, it works through the ac-
tivation of the task outcome states of specific characteristics which become 
relevant to the induced states of abstract task ability. 
Behavior type is the element which provides the connect.ion of behavior 
patterns to the task outcomes. That is, when behavior patterns become 
salient, high and low status behavior types are induced, conceptions of 
what high and low status behaviors are like, elements provide the bridge 
over which behavior patterns become relevant to states of abstract task 
ability, and ultimately relevant to the task outcome states. These ideas are 
formally stated in the assumptions below. 
Assumption* 2 (The Burden of Proof of Behavior Patterns) Given 
a salient behavior interchange pattern, its relevant behavior type will be in-
duced and thi., behavior type will become relevant to the similarly evaluated 
7 We use asterisks to indicate that these assumptions arc additions to the original as-
sumptions with the same numberl'!. 
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state of abstaract task ability, and the latter will become relevant to the 
similarly evaluated outcome state of the group ta.~k. 
The sequencing of structure completion assumption of the core theory 
describes how the salience and burden of proof assumptions operate to fur-
ther complete the situational structure as new actors become intera.ctants, 
and new status characteristics become salient in the situation. We now need 
to add to this assumption that the structure will be further completed as 
new behavior interchange patterns emerge in the situation. Each new be-
havior pattern, if it becomes salient, will result in structure development 
and expectations will be changed or modified. 
Behavior patterns, unlike status characteristics, arc temporal in nature. 
That is, they refer to behavior which necessarily occurs over time, and a. 
salient behavior pattern need not be visible at all times. We believe that 
once a. behavior pattern is established and becomes salient it will remain 
salient even if it is not visible. However, a new behavior pattern which 
reverses the parts of the actors may become salient, in which case the 
older pattern loses saliency. Thus if there is a salient behavior interchange 
pattern such that actor A defers to actor B, but over time a new behavior 
interchange pattern emerges such that actor B defers to acl.or A, it is not 
so much that a new status element has been added to the existing, but that 
a status element has been changed. The new pattern replaces the old, and 
the earlier pattern is no longer a part of the structure. The assumption is 
given below. 
Assumption* 3 (Structure Completion of Behavior Patterns) Everytimc 
a new behavior interchange pattern becomes salient, the o~tructurc will be 
further completed through the action of the burden of proof process. If a 
new behavior interchange pattern emerges in which the pattern parts poss-
esed by two actors are reversed, then lines joining the actor" with the.~e new 
pattern part.! are added io the graph structure replacing th.c old possesion 
lines wh.ich are dropped. 
At this point it may be worthwhile to look at an example of a. situational 
structure. Figure 1 shows a situational structure with two male and one 
female actors who are designated by a;. The task is not sex typed, and 
a behavior pattern, represented by b( +) and b(-) between the two males 
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has emerged. The diffuse status characteristic gender, which we designate 
by D in diagrams, discriminates between the actors, and therefore becomes 
salient in the situation. The behavior pattern also becomes salient as the 
two males, a1 and a2 , are not discriminated by a status characteristic. 
Since all these elements are not initially relevant to the task, they become 
task connected through the burden of proof process, and the structure is 
completed. The burden of proof connection of the behavior pattern parts is 
through the induced states of abstract behavior type, represented by B( +) 
and B(- ). The connection of the diffuse status characteristic is through 
the activated states of generalized expectations represented by f( +) and 
f(·- ). 
Figure 1 about here 
A graph such as the one above can be used to analyze each actors task 
connections. The basic idea is to determine the lengths and signs of the 
paths connecting each actor to the task outcome states. The length of a 
pat.h is the number of lines which make up the path, and the sign of a 
path is the product of the signs of the lines it contains, and the sign of the 
outcome state it connects to. 8 In this example the actor a1 is connected 
to the positive task outcome state by two positive paths of lengths four, 
and to the negative outcome state by two positive paths of lengths five, 
for a total of four positive paths. We assume that the strength, or the 
contribution to expectations of each path is given by a. function /(i), where 
i is the length of the path. The function yields values in the range (0, 1), 
and is a decreasing function of path length. 
The formation of aggregated expectation states assumption (assumption 
4) which is the central assumption of the mathematical formulation, de-
scribes how paths are combined t.o yield overall expectation values for ac-
tors. Like signed paths are combined according to the rule, 
f(i u j) = f(i) + f(j)- /(i). f(j) 
to yield a. positive expectation value, and a negative cxpcct.a.t.ion value for 
each actor. Then the overall expectation value for an actor is obtained by 
8 For a detailed description of path counting see Berger ct.a1. {1977). 
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substracting his negative expectations from his positive cxpcct.ations. The 
resulting value is in the interval ( -1, 1), and is the aggregated expecta !.ions 
of the actor in the situation. 
The important point to note is that behavior interchange patterns en-
ter into the formation of aggregated expectations exactly like other status 
elements, and combine with them in the formation of expectations. This 
unified treatment of different status elements allows us to capture the en-
tirety of the "expectations to behavior to expectations" cycle within one 
formulation. We can now describe the emergence of power and prestige 
orders on the basis of status characteristics, behavioral feedback, and the 
combination of both status characteristics and behavior. In this way the 
formulation can be used to explain and to predict behavior in both het-
erogenous and homogenous groups. 
Given the values of !.he function f(i) we can compute cxpccf.ation val-
ues, a.nd expectation standings for actors in a. given situational structure. 
However, even without knowing the function values we can use the for-
mulation to make statements about actors relative cxpect.at.ions in given 
situational structures. For example, in the structure given in Figure 1 we 
can see that actor a 1 is task connected with positive paths only, and that 
similarly actor a3 is task connected by negative paths only. On the other 
hand, actor a2 has, for each of his positive paths, a negative path of the 
same length. Therefore we can say that in this situation the actor a1 has 
the highest, and the actor a3 , the lowest expectations, with the actor a. 2 
having expectations in between the other two. 
Expectation standings are assumed to be the determinants of the power 
and prestige order. We present below a version of the Basic Expeclation 
Assumption, formulated for our current purposes. 
Assumption 5 (Basic Expectation Assumption) Gi1;en that p has formed 
a,qgregatcd expectation states for self and others, p 's power and prestige po-
sition will be a direct continous function of p 's expecta.lion standing in S. 
This assumption has been stated in genera.! terms, and we express these 
concepts in functional form when we construct specific: models. However, 
before we undertake specific model construction, legitimation ciTccts need 
to be included in the formulation. We believe that when a. sufr.cient.ly la.rge 
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number of actors have established behavior patterns with respect to the 
same single actor, such that each defers to him then they will all come 
to behave as though he was their legitimate leader, and that their power 
and prestige order was legitimate. We believe that this can only happen if 
the top actor does not posses any status characteristics which are socially 
recognized as non-leader characteristics. We generalize this latter notion as 
the actor not having negative reward expectations (Ridgeway and Berger, 
1986) in formulating our last assumtion. 
Auxilliary Assumption 1 (Legitimation on the Basis of Behavior) 
Given that a sufficiently large subset of actors have formed low-high behav-
ior pattern.! with respect to the top actor in the power and prestige order, 
and given that they do not have expectations that he will hold a lower status 
position, the actors will come to behave as if their power and prestige order 
!S a legitimate one. 
This assumption is called the "legitimation on the basis of behavior as-
sumption" because we believe that, as the literature suggests (Ridgeway 
and Bergcr,1986), legitimation of the power and prestige order can come 
about in different ways. The implication of the assumption is that legiti-
mation results in a change in how expectations are translated to behavior. 
As our previous discussion suggests, this change is of special importance for 
the behavior of the top actor in the power and prestige order as he takes 
on a leadership role. The assumption tells us that the prediction function 
has to have a. different form for groups with and without legitimated power 
and prestige orders. This assumption completes the formulation. 
The Specific Model 
The formulation is quite general. Within its scope conditions the effects 
of a number of situational variables may result in quite different configura-
tions of behavior patterns. This formulation does not attempt to describe 
the process of emergence of behavior patterns, but takes the results of the 
process as givcn. 9 Different kinds of groups operating under different condi-
tions can develop linear structures, or segmented structures, or incomplete 
9The formulation does make probabilistic statements about the emergence of behavior 
patterns: That is, status characteristics will lead to formation of expectations, and power 
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structures, or even no stable structure at all. The formulation can be ap-
plied to the analysis of different kinds of groups working under different. 
conditions. However, in order to do so it is necessary to construct specific 
models for given types of groups, by making additional assumptions about 
the process of emergence of behavior patterns. We will now construct such 
a specific model for the Bales group setting. 
The pertinent features of the early Bales group setting is that it is a lab-
oratory situation where a number (usually from two to twelve) previously 
unacquainted subjects are given a. discussion task and arc asked to reach a 
group decision in a limited amount of time. The discussion topic is usually 
a. human relations case, involving basic values, and as such is intrinsically 
interesting. The cases are usually complicated enough that the group has a 
real task in marshalling all the facts, evaluating them, and reaching a group 
decision. Given the nature of the task and the experimental instructions, it 
is reasonable to assume that a group in this setting is collectively oriented, 
and that the task is valued. However, the subjects have no expectations for 
extended interaction as a group, and therefore are unlikely to have a high 
level of personal investment in the group. 
The time limitation forces the group to develop a structure quickly, 
and the collective orientation coupled with the relative lack of personal in-
vestment works against status struggles, although they do occur. These 
conditions also make it unlikely that behavior patterns develop inconsis-
tently with any existing status characteristic differences. Thai. is, the actor 
who possess the high state of a status characteristic with respect to another 
acl.or is also likely to possess the positive part of the behavior pattern, if 
one develops between the two actors. By the same token, an established 
behavior pattern is unlikely to be reversed during a group session. At the 
same time, the literature on Bales groups suggests that power and prestige 
orders appear very quickly, and are usually linear (Bales, I !)55; Bales et 
a/., 1951; Fisek and Ofshc, 1970; Rosa and Mazur, ] 979). We therefore 
make the simplest assumption which will generate a. unique pattern that is 
and prestige differences, which in turn, will make some patterns more likely to appear than 
others. However, the patterns of importance, i.e. the ones to become Ralicnt 1 are the ones 
which develop between initial status equals, or are inconsistent with status characteristics. 
Therefore the formulation has little to say about what specific configurations will come to 
exist. 
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consistent with these points. 
Specific Model Assumption 1 In the Bales group setting the configura-
tion of behavior patterns develops in a transitive manner consistent with 
salient status characteristics, and is fully completed. 
Full completion of the configuration of behavior patterns refers to those 
patterns which can be salient; that is those between initial status equals, 
as behavior patterns consistent with status characteristic differentiation 
will not become salient. The assumption is, obviously, a simplfying one, 
which we use as a first approximation. Given the distribution of salient 
status characteristics, if any, in the situation, this assumption enables us to 
compute expectations for all actors in a given situation. Thus, for example, 
in a four person homogenous group, one actor would possess three positive 
behavior pattern parts, one actor two positive and one negative pattern 
parts, one actor one positive and two negative pattern parts, and finally 
the last actor would posess three negative pattern parts. Each positive / 
pattern part provides two positive paths of lengths four and five, and each 
negative pattern part provides two negative paths of the same lengths, 
and it is straight.forward to compute the expectations and the expectation 
standing of each actor. 
Computing expectations does presuppose that we know the values of 
the function /(i). These function values have traditionally been treated 
as empirical parameters to be estimated from data; however recent devel-
opments have made it possible to generate a priori values on theoretical 
grounds (Fisek, Norman, and Nelson-Kilger, 1989). We use these theoreti-
cally derived values to compute expectation standings. 
The next issue in specific model construction is the size of the "core" 
group necessary to generate a legitimate power a.nd prestige order. This 
issue has been identified earlier as an empirical issue, that is we have a pa-
rameter to be estimated. Our approach to this estimation problem is quite 
informal: we look for a reasonable assumption rather than applying formal 
estimation procedures. Table 1 below gives the rates of participations of 
the top two initiators for group sizes of three through eight for the original 
Bales data (Bales, 1970). 10 
10 The participation rates of actors of lower initiation ranks have not been reported here 
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Table 1 about here 
The top part of the table gives the total rates of participation, and dis-
plays a. trend which is one of the earliest to be noted in studies of Bales 
groups (Bales et a/., 1951): The difference in participation rate between 
the top two actors increases with group size. This trend has obvious im-
plications for the development of leadership. However, our discussion of 
legitimation suggests that it would be more appropriate to look seperately 
at rates of addressing the group as a whole and addressing individuals, be-
cause leadership is more likely to be manifested in addressing the group as 
a. whole. The rest of the table gives the rates for addressing the group as a 
whole and individuals seperately. It is clear that the observed trend of the 
differences between the two top actors is enhanced when rates of speaking 
to the group as a whole are considered, but disappears when the rates of 
addressing individuals are considered. This result is very much in line with 
our account. of legitimation. This seperation also highlights the shape of 
the trend: The trend is not linear, but is very much like a step function. 
The difference in rates is small for group sizes of three and four, increases 
dramatically for group size of five, and then remains essentially constant. 
Thus it seems unlikely that the trend is due to quantitative factors like an 
increase in the need for leadership behaviors as group size increases. How-
ever, the trend is consistent with our account of legitimation, and suggests 
that legitimate leadership may become possible in groups of size five. Thus 
we take five as our estimate of this parameter. 
To complete the specific model we need to specify the forms of the 
prediction functions. Before we do so however, a brief discussion of the 
genera.! nature of such functions is necessary. We believe that expectation 
standings are the primary determinants of power and prestige behaviors, 
but that they are not the only determinants. Thus for any function to 
predict such behaviors in a concrete setting must take other considerations 
into account. First of all, consider the fact that we lump togel.hcr a number 
of different behaviors such as producing performance outputs, receiving 
action opportunities, accepting and rejecting influence, and other similar 
behaviors as power and prestige behaviors. It is reasonable to assume 
to conserve space as they are not germane to the current argument. However we should 
note that the rates for the lower ranking actors decrease in a fairly linear way. 
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that for the same expectation standings, the differentiation in the rates 
of initiating or receiving these different behaviors will vary. For example, 
for a given distribution of expectation standings we would expect more 
differentiation in the rates of successful influence attempts than in the rates 
of overall participation. Clearly, actors are more likely to let an actor with 
low expectation standing speak than they would be to accept his opinion. 
Second, given the same kind of power and prestige behaviors, the de-
gree of differentiation is likely to differ depending on a number of contextual 
variables. For example, we would expect that the degree of differentiation 
of participation rates would increase with increasing task orientation. Sim-
ilarly we would expect that the nature of the sentiment relations in a group .. ' 
to increase or decrease the degree of differentiation on a. given type of power 
and prestige behaviors for the same expectation standing differences. 
These arguments suggest a prediction function with parameters to ac-
count for these effects. However a systematic body of evidence on the 
effects of contextual variables on power and prestige behaviors is not avail-
able. Therefore we shall not attempt to formulate a general function, but 
instead formulate the simplest possible one which can be used to predict 
participation rates. This seems reasonable because overall participation 
rates in the Bales group setting are a composite of different power and 
prestige behaviors some of which are more and some of which are less dif-
ferentiated. Further, we assume that there has been no particular attempt 
to manipulate contextual variables. Even with this limited objective, we 
need to formulate more than one function. 
The need for more than one prediction function sterns from the need / 
./ 
to treat speaking to individuals and speaking to the group as a whole as' 
different kinds of power and prestige behaviors. Our account of legitimation 
dynamics asserts that rates of speaking to the group as a. whole will change 
when the power and prestige order is legitimated in a group. The argument 
is that when the power and prestige order is legitimated in a group, the 
top actor in the order will behave as the group's leader. There is a new 
relationship between the leader and the other members of the group. The 
leader interacts with the others as a. single entity, a massed other. Thus 
speaking to the group as whole becomes the leaders special province and 
his rate increases while the rates of the others decrease. These ideas require 
that the most parsimonious model will involve two different functions, one 
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for predicting both rates of participation in situations where there is no 
legitimate order, and rates of speaking to individuals in situations where 
there is a legitimate order, and another one for predicting rates of speaking 
to the group as a whole for situations with legitimated orders. 
Considering the relationship between expectation standings and partici-
pation rates in general, the simplest possible functional relationship is that 
of equality. Both variables are measured in the same interval, (0, 1), they 
both sum to one for a given group, and the substance of the relationship 
is that the greater the expectation standing the greater the participation 
rate. Therefore we use the identity function in the simpler case, that is 
for rates in groups without legitimated orders, and for ra.tcs of speaking to 
individuals in groups with legitimated orders. However, something a little 
more complicated is called for in predicting the rates of speaking to the 
group as a whole in groups with legitimated orders. The idea. is that when 
addressing the others as a single entity, the leader is interacting with them 
as if they were a. single individual with status typical for their numbers. 
Therefore the massed other's expectation standing is simply expressed as 
the arithmetic mean of the expectation standings of the others. To obtain 
the leader's and the others' total share of speaking to the group as a whole 
from these two expectation standings, we normalize them, so that they sum 
to one. The total share of the others can then be allocated among them in 
proportion to their expectation standings. These ideas arc summarized in 
the assumption below. 
Specific Model Assumption 2 In the Bale.• group setting an actor's rate 
of participation will be equal to the actor's expectation standing, except for 
the rate of speaking to the group a.• a whole in groups with legitimated power 
and prestige orders, in which case the rate for the leader will be given by 
and for the others by, 
g; = (1- gt)-'';_ 
1 - St 
St 
i = 2, ... ,n. 
The first formula. gives the leader's rate of addressing the group as a. 
whole. The fraction in the denominator is the mean expectation standing of 
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the others in the group: Since expectation standings sum to one, one minus 
the leaders expectation standing gives the sum of the others' expectation 
standings, and (n - 1) where n is the number of actors in the group, is 
the number of others. Thus the entire first formula is l.hc normalization 
of the leader's expectation standing with the mean expedation standing 
of the others in the group. The second formula gives the rates for the 
other members: (1- gt) is the others' total share, and the second factor is 
the actor's expectation standing renormalized by leaving out. the leader's 
expectation standing. This assumption completes the specific model for 
the Bales group setting. 
Goodness of Fit 
The formulation wa.s motivated by the problems posed by the mixed sex 
groups in the Bales' setting studied by Skvoretz. We would like to evaluate 
the fit of the model we have constructed to this set of data. We have 
also sought data. from other groups in Bales-type settings where actors 
are systematically discriminated by status characteristics. A set of studies 
carried out by E. G. Cohen and her associates ( Cohen, 1972; Cohen and 
Roper 1985) provide data. on four person groups composed of two "high 
status" and two "low status" actors discriminated hy one cha.ra.cteristic, 
the characteristic being different in each study. We will also assess the fit 
of the model to this set of data.. Finally, we explore the fit of model to the 
original Bales data. a.s examples of homogenous groups. Since all the data 
predate the construction of the model, our evaluation of goodness of fit is 
not a test of the model, hut only an assessment of consistency of the model 
with the data. 
We evaluate the fit of the model to the mean rates or pa.rticipation for 
groups of given size and compostion. There are good reasons to expect in-
dividual groups to deviate considerably from the prcdicl.ions or the model, 
and no reason to he dismayed by such deviations. Certainly individual 
dispositional variables have a lot to do with participation rates. A group 
where, by chance, a number of actors of high disposition to participate 
have come together may not show the same participation ral.cs a.s a group 
of actors with low dispostions. Our model can capture some of the effects 
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of dispositional differences through behavior interchange patterns, as the 
actors with the higher dispositions to participate will tend f.o possess pos-
itive pattern parts, and those with lower dispositions will tend to possess 
negative pattern parts. However, the model cannot account for all disposi-
tional differences, a.nd cannot be expected to fit individual groups well. At 
the same time, experimental conditions cannot be expected t.o match the 
theoretical conditions of the model exactly. Whatever care experimenters 
take to match their subjects to form homogenous groups, there can be no 
guarantee that no status characteristics will become salient in the situa-
tion. Nor can one guarantee that all groups have the same level of task 
orientation, or the same levels of any other relevant contcxtJJa.l variables. 
However, given a. sample of groups of the same size and composition, and 
assuming there is no systematic bias, we can expect such differences of in-
dividual dispositions and experimental conditions to average out, leaving 
visible the social structural effects which we are trying to model. 
Our first assessment of fit is simply the comparison of predict.ed and 
observed participation rates for each set of data., and where possible, we 
use the standard error of the observed value to assess the goodness of fit. 
This common sense approach has traditionally been used with participation 
rate models for Bales' groups (cf. Kadane and Lewis, 1969). The second 
step is to do a regression of the observed rates on the predicted rates. Re-
gression analysis offers some important advantages in assessing goodness 
of fit. First, it. provides a summary measure, R2 , for the entire data. set. 
Furthermore, the measure has a. very straightforward interpretation as the 
percentage of the variation explained in the observed by the predicted, and 
is a commonly used measure in most quantitative work. Second, exam-
ination of the regression coemcients and the residuals can tell us about 
systematic biases the model might have. However, our usc of t.he regression 
model requires a. word of caution because there is dependence in our data.: 
If the model overpredicts a. participation rate for one rank for a. given group, 
it is going to have to underpredict another; participation rates for a given 
type of group sum to one. This makes autocori"elated error very likely. 
Serial autocorrelated error in time series, and autocorrelation in spatia.! 
distributions have been studied in detail (see Cliff and Ord, I 972; Judge, 
Griffiths, Hill and Lee, 1985), but there is no reference in the literature to 
this particular type of autocorrelation structure that we can find. Going 
30 
by general principles, it is known that the presence of a.utocorrelated error 
docs not bias parameter estimates but reduces their efficiency and makes 
their standard errors unreliable (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977). Along sim-
ilar lines positive autocorrelation can supuriously inflate R2 . However, in 
our case autocorrelation is likely to be negative: Over or underprediction 
in one case requires that an error in the opposite direction be made in at 
least one other case, within the same size and composition group. In fact 
since the data is ordered in terms of participation rank, autocorrelation 
should appear to be serial The Durbin- Watson statistic indicates the sign 
of the first order serial correlation, and therefore can be used to alert us 
to possible inflation of the R2 statistic. The dependence a.lso requires that 
we reduce the degrees of freedom for the residual by one for each type of 
group in a given data set. The regressions are also weighted by the square 
root of the sample size for each group size and composition, since within a 
set of data there usually a.re different numbers of given types of groups. 
The Skvoretz Data 
This data. is from six person groups in the Bales setting, where the sex 
composition of the groups has been systematically varied from all male to 
all female. The subjects are university undergraduates. In assessing the 
fit of the model to this da.ta we encounter the following problem: Our 
model predicts that in all male, and in five male - one female groups the 
power and prestige order will be legitimated, so the participation directed 
to individuals, and to the group as a whole have to be predicted seperately. 
But in the available data participations to the group as a whole, and to 
individuals are not reported seperately. We at least need to know the 
overall proportion of a.cts directed to the group as a whole in order to 
combine the predicted to-individual and to-group participation rates, to 
obtain a. predicted total participation rate. Therefore we estimate this 
proportion as a parameter by doing a simple grid search optimizing the 
fit of the regression model for these two types of groups. The estimate 
we obtain is that 17% of the acts are directed to the group as a whole.U 
11 This value is low compared to the original Bales groups where it is about 40%. How-
ever, these groups differ from Bales groups in important ways: The discussion sessions 
are twenty minutes long, compared to 45 minutes for the original Bales groupR1 so that 
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We use this value to generate total participation predictions for the all 
male, and five male- one female groups, and reduce the residual degrees of 
freedom by one in the regression analysis. Table 2 gives the observed and 
predicted proportions of participation for each initiation rank within each 
sex for these groups. 
Table 2 about here 
In this table, for each group composition the first column gives the 
predicted participation rate, the second column the observed participation 
rate, and the third column the sample standard error. Asterisks indicate 
those predictions which are more than two standard errors away from the 
observed. For each group composition, the males are listed first. in order of 
their participation rank among themselves, and than the females are listed 
in the same order. Examining the table, the first thing we note is that out of 
the 42 predictions 10 differ from the observed by more than two standard 
errors. This relatively large number of poor predictions can be partially 
explained by the dependency in the data, since given one prediction is off 
for in a particular type of group, a second prediction is a.lso likely to be 
off. It is also probably the case that the sample sizes arc too small to wash 
out individual differences, so that predictions for particular ranks are not 
successful. However, the model does capture the the general features of the 
distributions, such as the fact that the the proportions of participation for 
the top actor in all male and five ma.le, one female groups are higher than 
in the other groups, as predict.ed by the model. Therefore we feel justified 
in looking further at the over all fit of the model. The regression results 
are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
Quite obviously the R2 value obtained is quite high. 'I'hus it seems that 
although the model's point predictions are off on a. number of eases, the 
model does describe the overall features of the data quite well. Examin-
ing the coefficients of the regression equation, we sec that the regression 
there is less time for the development of leadership. The discussion task is a more emo-
tionally neutral task than Bales' human relations cases, and ca11s for less management of 
the discussion. 
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coefficient is larger than one by more than two standard errors and the 
intercept is also less than zero by more than two standard errors. This 
indicates that the model is underpredicting the higher participation rates, 
and overpredicting the the lower rates. The effect is not very large, how-
ever. The residual plots indicate a strong autocorrelation effect, but the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is not high enough to indicate a significant first 
order serial correlation, and is in the negative direction. 
There is one further way we can evaluate the goodness of fit of the 
predictions of the model to the data. The model predicts the rank positions 
of the males and the females for each gender composition, so that these 
orders can be compared to the observed orders. The data is reported in 
this form in Table 4. 
Table 4 about here 
There are no measures of concordance for ran kings where the elements 
ranked are not individually identified. Therefore we have constructed an ad 
hoc index whose values are given in the table. The index is the ratio of the 
correctly predicted pairwise orderings to the total pairwise comparisons, 
excluding the ties. The agreement between the predicted and observed 
orders is perfect in three cases out of five, slightly off in one case, and not 
very good in the fifth case. Our general evaluation is that the model does 
well in describing the overall distribution of participation rates. 
The Cohen Situation Data 
E. G. Cohen and her colleagues have conducted a. series of studies to de-
velop intervention techniques for changing expectations to counteract the 
negative effects of status charcf.eristic discrimination in cducnt.ional con-
texts (Cohen, 1972; Cohen and Roper, 1985). Each study in this set con-
tains a. control condition used to eva.lua.te the effect of interventions in the 
experimental conditions. These control conditions meet the conditions of 
the Bales setting, the only difference being that in most of the studies the 
task is playing a board game instead of the typical Bales discussion task. 
However, the actors have to discuss their moves and come to a joint group 
desicion as to how they are going to move the marker on the game board. 
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The game is not competitive, but cooperative, the goal being l.o reach the 
target and win as a group as quickly as possible. Each group is composed 
of four actors, two from a "high status" category, and two from a "low 
status" category. 
We will examine data from five studies in this series. Three of these 
studies use the game task. Of these studies, one by Lohman (1970) uses 
black and white junior high school students as subjects. The other two 
studies, by Morris (1977) and by Rosenholtz (1977) look at the effects of a. 
specific characteristic - reading ability reputation. Of the four elementary 
school students who participate in a. group two are reputed good readers, 
and two are reputed poor readers. The remaining two studies, one by 
Hall (1972), and one by Lockheed (1976) use a discussion task and look at 
male and female subjects who are teacher trainees. The participation rates 
observed in these groups and the model's predictions arc given in Table 5. 
Table 5 about here 
We do not have the standard errors for these observed participation 
rates, and therefore cannot evaluate the closeness of the predictions in such 
terms. However, the agreement between the predicted and the observed 
looks reasonable by visual inspection. The average difference between them 
is .0147, that is it is less than one and a half percent. It. is interesting to 
note that the model predicts that the less active actor of the bigher status 
category and the more active actor of the lower status category will have 
equal participation rates. In four of the five cases, this predict.ion is in good 
agreement with the da.ta, in the fifth case, the Hall study, there is a. fairly 
marked differentiation between the two actors. Despite this deviation, our 
eva.lua.t.ion is that the model describes the data. quite well. Table 6 presents 
the regression results. 
Table 6 about here 
The R square is high, even higher than for the Skvorctz data. The coef-
ficient of regression, and the intercept indicate a tendency to underestimate 
high, and overestimate low values. This same tendency wa,s also observed 
for the Skvoretz data; as in that earlier case, there is little reason to be 
concerned with this small effect at this stage of theoretical development .. 
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Residual plots indicate the existence of a.utocorrelated error, however the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is not large enough to indicate a. significant first 
order serial effect, and again is in the direction of negative autocorrelation. 
We have to conclude that the model fits this set of data., which includes data. 
from groups with fairly different tasks, with different subject populations 
and discriminated by different status characteristics, quite well. 
The Original Bales Data 
Finally, we would like to assess the fit of the model to the original Bales 
data (Bales,l970). Bales data. are coded sepera.tely for to-individuals a.nd 
to-group participations, so we can fit the model seperatcly for the two kinds 
of behaviors. This enables us to evaluate the legitimation aspects of the 
model in direct terms. Tables 7 gives the distributions of the observed and 
predicted to-individual participation rates. 
Table 7 about here 
It should be pointed out that the basic initiation rank of actors was de-
termined using total participations by Bales. Therefore when to-individual 
and to-group parl.ieipations are seperat.ed, their orderings can disagree. 
This is seen to happen for the top ranks in groups of five. Such a reversal 
is not consistent with our model; however the difference in the magnitudes 
of the two ra.tes is small, and given the small number of groups of this size, 
need not cause serious concern. In fact, the general agreement. between the 
predicted and observed participation rates seems to be quite good by visual 
inspection. The mean difference between them is .015, similar to the fits of 
earlier models (see Kadane and Lcwis,l969). We do two scpcra.te regression 
analyses: One is for the total participation rates in group sir.cs two through 
four (for these groups the model does not predict different to-group and 
to-individuals participation rates), and to-individuals participation rates in 
group sizes five through eight. The second is for the t.o-group participa-
tion rates in group sizes five through eight .. The resuli.s of these regression 
analyses are given in Table 8. 
Table 8 about here 
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For the first regression, the R2 value is large. Both the regression co-
efficient and the intercept differ from one and zero, respectively, by about 
one standard error. The Durbin-Watson statistic, !.hough on the positive 
side, is close to 2, which is the mean value under the null hypothesis. We 
conclude that the model fits the data. well. 
For the second regression, the R2 value is even higher; however, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is quite low - though not low enough to be sig-
nificant (a.t. a = .05 with n = 25 the critical values of D are DL = 1.29 
a.nd Du = 1.45). Residual plots also indicate that there is autocorrelation, 
and therefore spurious inflation of the R2 is a distinct possibility. However, 
even given this precautionary note, we still ha.ve to conclude that the fit 
is good, a.nd that overall the model is in good agreement with the original 
Bales' data. 
Summary Statement 
We started out to formulate a. theory which could account for the structur-
ing of power and prestige orders in both status heterogenous, a.nd status 
homogenous groups in open interaction situations. We have done so by in-
t.egra.ting two theories within the expectation states theory framework, the 
theory of status characteristics, and the theory of evolution of expectations. 
We have also introduced elements of legitimation dynamics into the theory. 
The resulting formulation, which is an extension of the mathematical of the 
theory of status characteristics and expectation states, can be used to pre-
dict the power and prestige orderings in status heterogenous, and initially 
status homogenous groups. 
We have constructed a specific model, based on the theory, to predict 
rates of participation in Bales type settings. We believe that this model fits 
the data. reported by Skvorctz quite well. We have demonstrated that the 
same model also fits well another set of data. on heterogenous groups, data 
which has been collected by E. G. Cohen's associates. vVc have also shown 
that the model fits the original Bales data. as well. The goodness of fit in 
each ca.se, as measured by R', is good. It should also he noted that. the 
model requires very little in the way of estimating parameters. The only 
such quantities to be used in the assessment of fit presented above were 
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the size of the core group necessary for legitimation and the proportion of 
to-group participations in the Skvoretz data. The model could be further 
refined by including an empirical parameter of "degree of differentiation". 
However, at this point of theoretical development this would essentially 
be curve fitting, and could possibly be misleading. What is called for is 
research into conditions which lead a group into greater or lesser degrees of 
differentiation given the same expectation structure. When such research 
is available then the fine tuning of the model can proceed. We believe our 
formulation, incorporating as it does the full feedback cycle of expectations 
to behavior and behavior to expectations, has furthered our understanding 
of the evolution of power and prestige orders, and is capable of generating 
further empirical and theoretical research. 
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Figure 1: A Situational Structure with Two Male Actors with a Behavior 
Interchange Between Them and a Female Actor 
Table 1: Participation Rates of the Two Top Actors in the Original Bales 
Groups by Grou Size 
Group Size 
Actor 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Total 
One .444 .322 .469 .431 .431 .398 
Two .327 .289 .219 .188 .152 .166 
To Group 
One .512 .365 .707 .621 .638 .577 
Two .272 .291 .119 .131 .087 .090 
To Individuals 
One .393 .296 .271 .288 .247 .249 
Two .363 .288 .302 .231 .209 .229 
N 26 89 9 18 15 8 
Ta.ble 2: Predicted and· Observed Participation Rates in the Skvoretz 
Grou s 
All male 5 Male - 1 Female 4 Male - 2 Female 
Rank Pred. Obs. SE Pred. Obs. SE Pred. Obs. SE 
1 .337 .367 .041 .317* .372 .016 .251 .264 .037 
2 .209 .238 .031 .193* .233 .013 .204 .174 .018 
3 .171 * .143 .012 .159 .145 .019 .161 .134 .016 
4 .133 .106 .018 .124 .122 .021 .117 .080 .022 
5 .096* .076 .008 .089* .035 .011 .161 .207 .032 
6 .056 .070 .008 .122 .094 .029 .107 .142 .050 
N 5 5 5 
3 Male - 3 Female 2 Male - 4 Female 
Rank Pred. Obs. SE Pred . Obs. SE 
1 .242 .254 .020 . 231 * .312 .032 
~ 
.192 .220 .028 .173* .109 .026 ~ 
3 .142 .100 .028 .220* .299 .019 
4 .192 .218 .051 .173 .155 .022 
5 .142 .131 .011 .126* .091 .015 
6 .091 .077 .015 .077 .035 .070 
N 4 5 
1 Male - 5 Female All Female 
Rank Pred. Obs . SE Pred. Obs. SE 
1 .213 . 275 .062 .273 .292 .012 
2 .247 .271 .024 .229 .229 .011 
3 .202 .173 .025 .187* . 216 .007 
4 .158 .151 .021 .146 .137 .013 
5 .113 .075 .021 .105 .086 .013 
6 .066 .056 .015 .061 .040 .015 
N 3 4 
Table 5: Observed and Predicted Participation Rates in the Cohen Sit.na-
Rosen-
Lohman Hall Lockheed Morris hollz 
2 White 2 Male 2 Male 2 Hillcad 2 HiRead 
Predicted 2 Black 2 Female 2 Female 2 LoRead 2 LoRead 
Hl .333 .330 .354 .329 .364 .364 
112 .250 .230 .205 .245 .240 .246 
L1 .250 .270 .278 .248 .248 .237 
L2 .167 .170 .163 .174 .147 .152 
N 14 20 8 18 20 
Table 6: Regression Results for the Cohen Situation Data 
R2 = .935 F( 1,13) = 260.526 
b = 1.140 SE(b) = .071 
Constant = -.035 SE(C) = .018 
Durbin-Watson= 2.177 Significant Residuals= 0 
Table 7: Predicted and Observed Participation Rates in Bales Groups 
Total Participation Rates for Group Sizes 2-4 
Two Actor Three Actor Four Actor 
Rank Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. 
1 .591 .573 .444 .444 .364 .322 
2 .409 .427 .333 .327 .287 .289 
3 .223 .229 .213 .228 
4 .137 .J 61 
N 41 26 89 
To-individual Participation Rates for Group Sizes 5-8 
Five Actor Six Actor Seven Actor Eight Actor 
Rank Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. 
1 .311 .271 .273 .288 .243 .247 .220 .249 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
N 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
.254 .302 .229 .231 .208 .209 .190 .229 
.200 .209 .187 .185 .175 .158 .163 .158 
.146 .141 .146 .136 .143 .128 . J 38 .125 
.089 .077 .105 .094 .111 .115 .113 .117 
.061 .065 .078 .077 .087 .060 
.043 .064 .060 .042 
.031 .020 
9 18 15 10 
To-Group Participation Rates for Group Sizes 5-8 
Five Actor Six Actor Seven Actor Eight. Actor 
Pred. Obs . Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. Pred. Obs. 
. 643 .707 .652 .621 .658 .638 .663 .577 
.132 .119 .109 .131 .094 .087 .082 .090 
.104 .088 .089 .084 .079 .074 .070 .090 
.075 .057 .070 .075 .065 .066 .059 .066 
.046 .029 .050 .049 .050 .. 053 .0,19 .048 
.029 .040 .035 .047 .038 .048 
.019 .034 .026 .0'14 
.013 .013 
Table 8: Regression Results for Bales Data 
Total (Group Sizes 2-4) and 
To-Individual (Group Sizes 5-8) Participation Rates 
R Squared = .978 F( 1,26) = 1446.226 
b = .972 SE(b) = .026 
Constant = .006 SE(C) = .007 
Durbin-Watson = 1.916 Significant Residuals= 0 
To-Group Participation Rates (Group Sizes 5-8) 
R Squared = .989 F( 1 ,20) = 2083.811 
b = .956 SE(b) = .021 
Constant = .007 SE(C) = .006 
Durbin-Watson = 1.572 Significant Residuals= 1 

